I n terms of political agency in the United States, federal outlays to states and districts are where the rubber meets the road. Elected federal representativesmembers of the House and Senate-scramble to deliver public dollars to their constituents. The motives of these agents are complex (Fenno 1973) , but in the legislative field the stylized fact of which we are the most confident is the centrality of the desire for reelection (Mayhew 1974) . As a consequence, politicians master the geographic, socioeconomic, and demographic complexion of their states and districts, as well as the profile of partisan, candidate, and policy preferences of various constituencies (Fenno 1978) , in order to identify with and advance local interests and, as a by-product, their own careers.
term structure of representatives and senators. On the first Tuesday after the first Monday of November in evennumbered years, all 435 seats in the House are in play, while only a third of those in the Senate are. Senate and House members differ in term length (six years versus two years) and constituency (states versus districts). But the Senate should not implicitly be thought simply a largerconstituency, longer-term version of the House. The Senate is a staggered-term legislative chamber. As established in Article I, Section 3 of the Constitution, Senate seats are partitioned into three classes (with the two seats of any state necessarily in different classes). 1 In any election year, contests for a third of these seats occur, but those for the remaining two-thirds are two years or four years into the future. The electoral connection, then, implicates every district in every state in House elections, but only 33 (sometimes 34) of the 50 states in Senate elections.
Putting these three things together-reelection ambition, the necessity for bicameral reconciliation on legislation, and chamber-specific electoral rhythms-suggests something that not even the authors of Article I, Section 3 anticipated. One important source of bicameral tension arises within state delegations as senators and members of Congress operate on different time horizons and with different intertemporal perspectives.
2 The modest assumptions of retrospective voting (Fiorina 1981 (Fiorina , 2003 and recency bias, in which constituents assess past accomplishments giving greater weight to more recent performance-what Weingast, Shepsle, and Johnsen (1981) refer to as the "what have you done for me lately" principle (WHYDFML)-imply that reelection-conscious politicians, eager to make a maximal reputational impression on retrospectively inclined voters, will seek to deliver federal outlays to their states and districts just in time to be appreciated as their reelection campaigns kick into high gear.
3 Thus, at the end of congress t, when a senator and his or her state-delegation colleagues in the House are in reelection campaigns, their joint incentives 1 For the distribution of states across classes, and the time series of their initial assignments to classes, see http://www.thegreenpapers .com/Hx/SenateClasses.html. Table 1 gives the states in each class. Table 2 gives the order in which they were assigned, beginning with the first 22 senators on May 15, 1789. are correlated-all want the skids to have been recently greased with federal outlays in the state so that all can claim some credit. Likewise, at the conclusion of congress t + 1, when the other senator from the state joins his or her House colleagues in a reelection campaign, joint incentives are correlated. In congress t + 2, however, there is no Senate election in the state, and the House delegation must plan reelection campaigns in the absence of a statewide (federal) race.
Why should this matter? The answer derives from the staggered-term feature of the Senate. With only a portion of the Senate absorbed in a contest at each election date, and with all senators eager to shine in the runup to reelection as a consequence of WHYDFML behavior by constituents, the membership of the staggered-term Senate can arrange things in a manner not available to the simultaneous-term House membership. Specifically, senators can implement an intertemporal deal, allocating a disproportionate share of (discretionary) federal outlays to just those senators who can benefit most from them, namely those facing a reelection campaign "this time." Each senator will be in this privileged category at the end of his or her six-year cycle. Since every senator would, according to the WHYDFML logic, prefer concentrated benefits toward the end of the cycle to a smoothing of benefits throughout the cycle, it is a deal to which all senators, in principle, could subscribe. Shepsle, Dickson, and Van Houweling (2004) argue that this deal is an equilibrium with off-the-path behavior policed by a rather simple "punishment scheme" (deterring those who try to deviate by attempting to secure benefits when it is not "their" turn). Muthoo and Shepsle (2006) provide a rigorous demonstration of this result.
In this article we introduce bicameralism to this model. To do so we build on a standard divide-the-dollar game in two ways. First, we add a simplified model of the conference bargaining process that allows us to illustrate basic interchamber dynamics. Second, we formalize the concept of contested credit claiming, i.e., that members of a state's House and Senate delegations must share the credit for appropriations to their state in a manner that only partially depends on which chamber originates the appropriation. This sets the stage for strategic interaction between the chambers. We limit our attention here to the relatively simple question of how a nonstaggered-term House seeking a universalistic allocation of pork would best respond to the irregular appropriations that characterize the equilibrium distribution we identify for the staggered-term Senate. We use a dataset of appropriations projects compiled by the Citizens Against Government Waste (CAGW) to examine hypotheses derived from our theoretical account. Along the way we draw on interviews of Appropriations Committee staff in both chambers to assist in framing the theory and interpreting the results of our analysis. 4 We uncover several new dynamics of appropriations politics driven by the institutional features of bicameralism and the staggered-term structure of the Senate. To preview our findings, across all substantive jurisdictions, the number of projects allocated by the Senate ranges between 15 and 30% higher (with a similar premium in dollar amounts) to states with incumbent senators standing for reelection than to other states, and the House regularly counteracts approximately two-thirds of this bias. These findings support our simple model of interchamber politics and contested credit claiming, which points one way forward in the developing study of bicameral legislatures.
Theoretical Argument
Much of the empirical research on discretionary federal spending has, like research on Congress generally, focused heavily on the House. With some major exceptions (e.g., Ansolabehere, Snyder, and Ting 2003; Lee and Oppenheimer 1999) , it is almost as though bicameralism did not exist at all. And, when the Senate is taken on board, it is often treated as essentially "House-like"-in particular, as a parallel chamber of simultaneous-term legislators. We cannot take on the full-blown agenda of bicameral politics here.
5 However, as a step in that direction we want to know whether the existence of an upper chamber with heterogeneous legislator time horizons arising from its staggered-term feature, and thus not synchronized with the tempo of the lower chamber, makes any difference for our models of pork barrel politics. In other words, does the fact of a Senate election (or its absence) in a given state at the end of a congress affect conventional wisdom about the allocation of federal outlays during that congress or the promise of future outlays?
If senators had a term length identical to that of representatives then we might expect no systematic effect of bicameralism (putting party and other institutional differences aside for the moment). Each chamber's representatives would seek outlays for their states and districts in every congress. If senators had a term length different from representatives but all senators were up simultaneously, we might expect a bump in spending in all congres-sional districts in those years involving the Senate races. But if we have an arrangement like that ordained in Article I, Section 3, then we need to derive the implications of this for legislative pork barrel preferences and politics.
There is considerable literature and lore outside of the pork barrel context on how senators behave over the course of their term, and in particular on how they respond to constituent preferences that may display WHYDFML-like time biases.
6 And there is accumulated, but contingent, evidence that suggests senators change some types of behavior as they prepare to confront the voters. One issue that has received substantial attention is whether senators take different positions on roll-call votes as election approaches (see Ahuja 1994; Amacher and Boyes 1978; Bernstein 1991; Elling 1982; Hibbing 1984; Jackson 1974; Matthews 1960; Poole 1981; Shapiro et al. 1990; Thomas 1985; Wainer, Gruvaeus, and Zill 1973; Wright and Berkman 1986) . The conclusions are mixed-on many issues senators' voting records display continuity over their terms. However, with respect to valence or "third-rail" issues, the evidence is unambiguous: senators avoid voting on the "wrong" side of these issues toward the end of their terms (see Theriault 2005). 7 Another question that has received significant scholarly attention is how senators spend their time as reelection approaches. Again, the case for behavioral cycles tracking electoral cycles is strongest for activities with clear electoral upsides and small electoral downsides. For example, senators can and do raise more money (Fenno 1982; Hall and Van Houweling 2006) , travel back to their home state more often (Fenno 1982) , and cosponsor more legislation (Campbell 1982) as election approaches. Theoretical expectations about how they will manage costly 6 For example, one 18-year Senate veteran told Richard Fenno:
We say in the Senate that we spend four years as a statesman and two years as a politician. You should get cracking as soon as the last two years open up. You should take a poll on the issues, identify people to run your campaign in different parts of the state, raise money, start your PR, and so forth. (Fenno 1982, 29) And Donald Matthews relates Senator Alben Barkley's account of confronting a constituent he had assisted many times over the years about his betrayal of Barkley at the ballot box: "Surely," Barkley said, "you remember all these things I have done for you?" "Yeah," said Farmer Jones sullenly. "But what in hell have you done for me lately?" (Matthews, 1960, 218) 7 For example, take the 1991 pay raise bill engineered through the Senate by Majority Leader Robert Byrd. Most senators were eager for the bill to pass, but wished not to be recorded in support. Byrd was able to secure passage by building a coalition that did not include most of those who faced reelection in 1992. Timothy Groseclose brought this example to our attention, which we developed in Shepsle, Dickson, and Van Houweling (2004) . legislative activity are less easy to derive. Introducing and amending legislation in the year just prior to reelection, for example, might enhance their images, but as election approaches, the opportunity cost of these activities is quite high given the alternatives of fundraising and campaigning. Not surprisingly, empirical evidence on this point is mixed. 8 Overall, however, when the benefits are clear and the costs manageable, senators do seem to confirm the folk wisdom of altering their positions and activities as reelection approaches.
Roll-call voting and allocating one's time and effort are individual choices entirely under a senator's control. A senator can shift action and emphasis as the election calendar requires. Earmarks and pork barrel projects are a different matter. They introduce a different dynamic because senators cannot single-handedly satisfy the WHYDFML bias of their voters by simply changing their behavior. While a senator may devote effort to get distributive projects awarded to his or her state at election time, this effort may not be sufficient to secure them. To get more means to take from other senators, and given the formally equal parliamentary status of senators there is no reason to assume, a priori, that this is possible even if a senator is willing to expend additional effort in the cause. In short, a model of the collective decision process inherent in passing appropriations legislation becomes necessary. Elsewhere we have addressed this puzzle of how a standard divide-the-dollar game might play out when senators have preferences driven by a WHYDFML effect (Muthoo and Shepsle 2006; Shepsle, Dickson, and Van Houweling 2004) . In the next section, we provide a brief overview of the argument and then extend it to the bicameral setting.
Divide the Dollar in the WHYDFML Senate
Imagine three classes of senators {t, t + 1, t + 2}. One type faces reelection now (class t), another type faces election in the following congress (class t + 1), and the third faces reelection in the congress after that (class t + 2). 9 In each congress there is a dollar of federal outlay to divide. We do not tackle the revenue side of the equation, so the total amount of outlay is taken as fixed and exogenous.
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In effect, we have a repeat-play version of the BaronFerejohn (1989) divide-the-dollar game. The difference in our version is that the senators are of different types, and this difference affects their preferences over alternative outlay profiles.
A senator values reelection, and his or her probability of reelection is written in terms of the outlays delivered to the folks back home. (Of course, this probability may be affected by other things as well.) A senator of class t, for instance, is reelected with probability (s t−2 , s t−1 , s t ), where s i is the share of the dollar he or she secured for the state in congress i. Two assumptions about are made. The first, weak monotonicity, says that in any congress more is no worse than less, i.e., the probability of reelection is weakly increasing in the amount of federal outlays in each of the three congresses of the electoral cycle. The second, the WHYDFML (or weak recency bias) principle, says that voters assess performance retrospectively, giving more weight to outlays in congress i than in congress i − 1.
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Considering unicameral preferences first before moving to a fully bicameral setting, suppose each congress an exogenously provided dollar is divided among the senators by majority rule. The closed-rule version of the congress t stage game is as follows. A senator is randomly recognized to make a proposal taking the form of an allocation of the dollar to the three senators in congress t. This proposal is immediately put to a vote. If a majority supports the proposal then it is implemented; if not then outlays are set to zero for each senator that congress. If each play of the stage game is history-independent, then the only equilibrium is one in which whoever is recognized to make a proposal proposes to take essentially the entire dollar for his or her own state. (She need give only ⑀ to one other.)
If, however, players may condition their behavior in congress t on what has transpired in earlier congresses, then an equilibrium exists in which the senator recognized to make a proposal offers a portion of the dollar (perhaps the entire dollar) to the class t senator-the one who will face reelection at the conclusion of the present congress. The optimal portion cannot be described in general without further assumptions about , but if this function is concave, then the optimal portion going to the class t senator is disproportionately large. In equilibrium, each senator is reelected with probability (s * t−2 , s * t−1 , s * t ), where s * i is the amount specified in the optimal distribution. Elsewhere we demonstrate that this distribution can be sustained with a punishment scheme.
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The important point for present purposes is that this optimal distribution characterizes an intertemporal norm that in the congress just before his or her reelection campaign a senator receives a disproportionate share of what there is to get (and/or bears disproportionately less of the burdens others bear). Senators engage in an intertemporal trade, foregoing some of their "fair share" of outlays in congresses more distant from their reelection date in exchange for getting more than this share close to reelection. Their staggered terms enable this.
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In summary, we have a simple theoretical argument-stripped of many real-world features to be sure-that suggests a preference of senators to concentrate outlays in the latter congresses of a senator's electoral cycle (back-loading). In contrast, in many economic contexts the tendency is the opposite of back-loading, pressing instead toward smoothing payoffs across all periods (concave utility function), or even front-loading (positive discount factor). Retrospective voting and recency bias, however, promote this back-loading of benefitsin particular, the extra weight voters give to the recent 12 Given the monotonicity assumption-is weakly increasing in all its arguments-there is often a temptation to defect from this norm. This may occur if a senator early in her term of office is recognized and proposes to keep "too much" of the dollar for herself, giving a smaller than optimal amount to the senator about to face his voters. In effect, there is a temptation to secure extraordinary outlays even when it is not a senator's "turn." A simple punishment regime deters this temptation. If a senator should secure outlays for her state out of turn in violation of the norm, then the other senators punish her by not allowing outlays to her state in the congress in which she faces reelection. It may be shown that this punishment is credible and is sufficient to deter norm-violating behavior.
past relative to the more distant past induces senators to support an institutional arrangement that concentrates their share of outlays into the congresses that do them the most good.
14 Our empirical analysis provides an initial test of whether the Senate back-loads earmarks in the manner suggested by this theoretical account. Before proceeding to examine this question, however, we embed our simple model of the staggered-term WHYDFML Senate in the broader context of bicameralism and contested credit claiming.
Bicameralism and Contested Credit Claiming
We assume funds appropriated for a pork barrel project have an unambiguous state-and-district address. Since a project is earmarked to a geographic destination, this allows the two senators and one member of the House delegation from the state to claim credit in principle for it. A legislator may try to provide direct and verifiable evidence to constituents of the lengths to which he or she has gone to secure the result. But often legislators engage in cheap talk. For example, many of the staff members we interviewed commented on the competition over credit claiming through press releases. One Senate Appropriations subcommittee staff director told us that he would only tell members of one particularly quarrelsome Senate delegation what projects their state received in the subcommittee markup when representatives for both senators were present in his office to hear the news at the same time. We know of few attempts, in the more than three decades since Mayhew (1974) coined the concept, to provide microfoundations for credit claiming. This is a problem inasmuch as many elected officials are potentially in a position to claim credit for a particular project.
Here we initiate an analysis of how contested credit claiming might influence pork barrel politics in a legislature with a staggered-term upper chamber. To do so we develop an illustrative three-state example of how a lower chamber whose members face reelection in each period and prefer a universal distribution of pork would optimally respond to an upper chamber that back-loads appropriations to the states of senators standing for reelection.
To begin we assume that in each congress each chamber divides $1 among three states generating chamberspecific pork vectors with elements s ij and h ij , which identify Senate and House allocations in congress i to state j. 15 We assume that the final bill simply adds up elements of these vectors to reach a conference pork vector, with elements c ij = s ij + h ij. Our interviews suggest that this simplification is surprisingly close to reality. One House Appropriations staff member, for example, described a budget account that was explicitly divided into four with each partisan delegation in each chamber having authority over its share. Other interviews suggested this was the implicit norm for many of the most heavily earmarked accounts, although it was typically not explicitly codified.
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Continuing with the model, we assume that at the end of each congress, all House members face reelection (one at-large from each state). Of the six senators (two from each state) only one from each of two different states faces reelection; neither senator from the third state is up.
We develop our example by considering senators driven by a strong WHYDFML effect that leads them to prefer an allocation that splits the dollar equally between the two states with senators standing for reelection and gives nothing to the other state. In this context, the Senate pork vector is (0,
).
17 For maximum contrast we will assume that members of the House prefer universal distribution of the dollar, making the preferred House pork vector ( ). If the members of a chamber retained full credit for the appropriations made by their chamber (and are not able to claim credit for the appropriations made by the other chamber), then the actions of the other chamber would be irrelevant to them. They would simply implement their preferred chamber-specific pork vectors each period. 15 We assume that each House delegation has one at-large member. This leads to the same conclusions as the assumption that states have an identical number of districts that split the House pork vector evenly. However, it eliminates variation in state size from the model, which is one well-understood source of bicameral tension (see Hauk and Wacziarg 2007; Lee and Oppenheimer 1999) . We have explored a model that incorporates states of different sizes and it suggests that the Senate will typically exaggerate the allocations it gives to small states and the House will veer from a universalistic distribution to counteract this Senate bias. 16 When we asked whether the House adopts the strategy of using excessive appropriations to stake out bargaining positions, the House staff member who described the explicitly divided account informed us that this does not typically happen. One problem he noted with this strategy is that it creates a situation in which a member may lose an appropriation in conference for which he or she has already claimed credit. It is also worth noting that adding up the chamber-specific vectors has the same consequences in our model as assuming the chambers split the difference on their allocation to each state. 17 In this example, we do not treat how Senate delegations share credit for allocations made to their state. The Senate allocation identified in the example is consistent with the assumption that a senator up for reelection from a state at the end of a congress gets full credit for any allocation to his or her state in that congress. 
(0, 0, 1) (
(
However, we want to consider what happens when members of one chamber can claim credit for a share of the allocations to their electoral jurisdiction produced by the other chamber. We formalize this with a single parameter ␥ ∈ [.5, 1], where members of the originating chamber receive credit for ␥ of the allocations going to their states and the members of the other chamber receive 1 − ␥ . Thus in congress i the at-large House member from state j would receive credit for ␥ h ij + (1 − ␥ )s ij of the conference pork vector c ij , while the senators from state j would jointly receive credit for (1 − ␥ )h ij + ␥ s ij. On the assumption that the Senate splits its dollar equally between the two states with Senate elections, Table 1a provides illustrations of how the House can adjust its House pork vector to generate a conference pork vector that smooths payoffs for House members given various values ␥ .
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There are three things to note about these allocations. First, the House is always able to counteract the Senate's strong WHYDFML-induced bias and allow its members to enjoy equal payoffs. Second, as we mentioned above, when credit is not shared across the chambers (␥ = 1), the House need not anticipate or react to the Senate allocation because it is by definition irrelevant to the House payoffs. Finally, the total allocation to the states will be more lopsided when the chambers retain more credit for their pork vectors. This is most evident when considering 18 The House best response allocates h j = 3␥ s j −3s j +1 3␥
to the two states that have senators standing for reelection and 1 3␥ to the state that does not have a senator standing for reelection and thus was allocated nothing by the Senate. The payoffs for the Senate delegation are prior to any sharing within the delegation or WHYDFML discounting.
the extreme values of the sharing parameter. If the members of each chamber retain all of the credit for the chamber's allocations, then the bicameral allocations that states receive in the fattest congress in a cycle will be almost three times as large as what they receive in the leanest congress ( 1 3 vs . 5 6 ). At the other extreme, when the two chambers share credit equally, the allocation to states will not vary because the House can fully compensate for the Senate WHYDFML bias, thereby ensuring smooth payoffs to its members. Thus, the ability of the Senate to satisfy the WHYDFML preferences of its members declines as members of each chamber manage to claim credit for the allocation made by the other chamber.
19
One interesting extension of our simple model is to consider how retirement of incumbent senators might disrupt or distort the Senate cycle and how this would influence the House response. If our WHYDFML premise is correct, then a retiring incumbent has little incentive to fight for pork (though our interviews suggest they still make routinized requests), and, more importantly, the chamber has little incentive to support an allocation giving a positive amount of pork to the retiring incumbent's state. In our three-state example, the Senate could adopt a pork vector of (0, 0, 1), giving all of the dollar to the state of the only incumbent standing for reelection. 20 If the Senate made this allocation, the optimal response of the House would change as reflected in Table 1b . 21 The basic dynamics do not change as long as the members of each chamber retain two-thirds or more of the credit for their chamber's appropriations. Below that point the budget of the House is insufficient to fully smooth the payoffs to its 19 We have not yet formally demonstrated that the Senate backloading pork vector and the House best response to it are in equilibrium. To do so requires us to give consideration to the issue of how senators not up for reelection from a state claim credit for pork received by the state in those years they are not up. This adds a complication to our analysis that is not relevant to the empirical work to follow (it concerns intrastate issues for a senatorial delegation), so we defer resolving it here. 20 The Senate could also adopt a more sophisticated response by reallocating some of the money that would have been claimed by the retiring incumbent to the incumbent that is not up in the cycle, so that the incumbent who is running does not achieve disproportionate gains from the retirement decision of the other incumbent in his or her cohort. 21 The House best response allocates h j = In sum, we embed the WHYDFML effect, the Senate electoral cycle, and a House preference for universalism in a theoretical framework in order to demonstrate how contested credit claiming affects the interchamber allocation of pork. Below we develop hypotheses that apply the basic insights of our approach to the real world of appropriations politics.
Hypotheses
Our first hypothesis grows from our previous theoretical work on the Senate electoral cycle. The illustrative example above adopts a version of the WHYDFML effect that induces maximal back-loading-to the point that the equilibrium allocation in the Senate would give nothing to a state in which neither member is standing for reelection. Our other theoretical treatments (Muthoo and Shepsle 2006; Shepsle, Dickson, and Van Houweling 2004) do not depend on such a strong recency bias and allow the possibility of a more muted cycle. 23 Thus, while the extreme WHYDFML bias in the illustrative development above is unlikely, we nevertheless anticipate that a state's position in the electoral cycle and whether it has a running incumbent will affect its success in securing Senate appropriations:
The electoral cycle in the Senate induces the appropriations process in that chamber to favor states with incumbent senators standing for reelection compared to states with no Senate election or an incumbent retiring.
Our illustrative model explores the potential for the staggered-term Senate electoral cycle to create bicameral tensions in the appropriations process. One conclusion 22 Another possible extension of the model would incorporate the partisan goals of House and Senate caucuses. This could complicate the punishment strategies that sustain the cyclical and countercyclical patterns in the House and Senate. On the one hand, the members of either party might balk at punishing their copartisans if they defected from the cyclical deal because punishing them could reduce the probability that their party would hold a majority after the next election. On the other hand, members of each party might realize that an optimal distribution of pork within their party across an electoral cycle would provide the best chance for their collective success. Moreover, this desire for a partisan majority could provide extra motivation, beyond that provided by the interests of individual incumbents, for the cyclical patterns in the Senate and the countercyclical ones in the House. Given the traditionally bipartisan politics of appropriations, we do not start with this more complicated partisan model. 23 Even voters with a recency bias might, for example, remember and punish their senators if they actually left the cupboard completely bare for an entire congress.
we reach is that the incentive for the House to take into account actions of the Senate depends on the degree to which House members are able to claim credit for appropriations that are initiated in the Senate and vice versa. The model suggests that only if each chamber shared equal credit for the appropriations of the other chamber would the House choose to equalize outlays across states and thus fully compensate for the cyclical bias of the Senate.
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However, if the House shares at least some of the credit for Senate actions, then we expect that if there is a cycle in Senate appropriations there will be a somewhat less distinct countercycle evident in the House. Our second hypothesis is:
The House appropriations process will partially compensate for the cyclical bias inherent in the Senate process.
Data and Analysis

CAGW Data
Our empirical analysis is based on a dataset of appropriations compiled by the Citizens Against Government Waste (CAGW). On its website the CAGW identifies pork that the Congress added to appropriations legislation for each year since 1995. The list is compiled by CAGW researchers who examine appropriations bills for the projects that meet at least one, and usually two, of seven criteria. 25 In practice, most of the pork consists of projects not in the administration's budget request and added by only one chamber or in conference. The CAGW identifies the state that benefits from each project (if possible) as well as the stage in the appropriations process where it was added. This allows us to evaluate our hypotheses about how the appropriations process operates in the Senate as well as how the chambers strategically interact. We employ the earmark data for a 10-year period, 1995-2004. There is an observation during this period for each subcommitteestate-year. Thus, the dataset initially contains 6,500 observations (13 Senate Appropriations subcommittees × 24 See the last row of Table 1a , where the House counter to the Senate allocation produces two-thirds of a dollar going to each state (district). 25 These are as follows: requested by only one chamber of Congress; not specifically authorized; not competitively awarded; not requested by the president; greatly exceeds the president's budget request or the previous year's funding; not the subject of congressional hearings; or serves only a local or special interest. 50 states × 10 years), 4,300 of which remain when we eliminate jurisdictions (see below) that did not add any CAGW-identified pork to an appropriation bill in a particular year.
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There are at least three possible concerns about these data. The first concern arises because the dataset only includes projects that survived in the final bill. Thus it does not, for example, allow us to observe whether the House succeeds in removing projects that originated in the Senate bill and favored senators facing reelection. This cuts against our finding an in-cycle effect in the Senate and might also make it difficult to observe strategic interaction between the chambers-in this sense the data we are using offer a conservative test of our hypotheses.
The second concern arises from the fact that CAGW uses the initial presidential budget request as a baseline. If this budget request itself is shaped strategically, then we may be misestimating the total impact of biases in the congressional appropriations process on the distribution of pork across states. If, on the one hand, the administration attempts to mute the cyclical biases in the two chambers with its initial budget request by underproviding projects for in-cycle states, then the CAGW data might capture an overreaction from the two chambers. This could lead us to overestimate the strength of the chamber-specific biases, but only because the administration is already responding to these very biases. If, on the other hand, the administration request seeks to curry favor with in-cycle senators, then the CAGW data could understate the chamberspecific biases. Either way, the CAGW data are unlikely to lead us to infer that cyclical effects exist if they do not.
Finally, the data only capture appropriations as they are made, which might or might not be when members accrue the majority of credit for them. There is the possibility of a lag between when Congress appropriates and when a member can claim credit. For example, the credit a legislator gets from funding a bridge may come when the ribbon is cut rather than when funds are allocated to 26 The procedure for allocating these types of projects accords well with our divide-the-dollar theoretical model. In any given year, the budget resolution sets overall spending limits for Congress that are used by the Appropriations Committee as the basis for making 302(b) allocations to each appropriations subcommittee-a fixed amount of money that a subcommittee must divide among all programs under its jurisdiction. The subcommittee then divides these funds among different accounts that fund particular authorized programs. Earmarks are made within those accounts. In any given year, members who request projects within the same accounts are directly competing with each other for that fixed pot of money, while members requesting projects within the same bill are also competing with each other for the fixed pot of money available for that bill. Although the number of CAGW projects has been expanding from year to year, our interviews suggest that their availability is far outstripped by member demand. Thus, they cannot be costlessly provided to members who are seeking reelection. begin construction. If this is the case, then we might see senators pursuing longer time-horizon projects earlier in their terms and instant hits later, which would attenuate the earmark cycle we expect. Another consideration that might attenuate cycles has to do with seeking credit at various stages-authorization, appropriation, outlay-from different groups in the geographic constituency. Credit claiming, in short, is complex and multifaceted. To the extent that the CAGW measure of appropriations projects is an imperfect indicator of the multiple opportunities for credit claiming, it might not ebb and flow with Senate electoral cycles in accord with our hypotheses.
Despite these reservations, we believe the CAGW data are well suited to addressing our chamber-specific hypotheses. We should be clear that we are not examining the full-blown budget-authorization-appropriation cycle in Congress; that is a much larger task. Rather we want to see whether traces of the effects our theoretical analysis implies are evident in the data on appropriations. We are skimming the cream off of the appropriations process and this limits the generality of our empirical analysis. However, our goal is to assess a fundamental intuition about how the chambers interact in this restricted setting, with an eye toward the possibility that similar dynamics may be present in legislative contexts that are more complex, contingent, and difficult to analyze empirically. are five subcommittees that the CAGW almost never identifies as adding particularized benefits to appropriations bills during the period we study: District of Columbia, Foreign Operations, Homeland Security, Legislative, and Treasury. For the purposes of the remaining analysis we exclude these subcommittees. In the remaining nine jurisdictions the average number of CAGW-coded additions per state from the Senate ranges from a low of 1 project per state for the Defense subcommittee (note that Military Construction is a separate subcommittee) to a high of 5.9 for the Veterans Affairs and Housing and Urban Development subcommittee. The range across jurisdictions is slightly wider in the House and in conference. One notable outlier in conference is the Labor and HHS jurisdiction, which relies almost exclusively on the conference venue to earmark bills. Table 3 displays the average number of CAGW-coded additions per subcommittee-state in each year in our dataset. There is a strong trend over time in the average amount of pork per state. In the Senate, for example, the average number of projects for each state grows from less than one per subcommittee to around four over the 10-year period of analysis. The growth in the amount of CAGW pork added in the House and, particularly, in conference is even more substantial. 27 The CAGW claims that 27 Conference earmarking was facilitated by an abrupt change in conference procedures with the Republican takeover of Congress in 1995. Prior to 1995, the "passback" procedure was used for appropriations bills. The House would pass a bill, the Senate would offer a series of amendments to it, and the two chambers would conference only on the specific issues in disagreement. This meant that any provision that violated conference rules (e.g., scope of differences) had to receive a specific vote. Starting in 1995, the Senate this trend is due to an increase in the number of projects added to bills that meet their criteria rather than a change in data gathering criteria or methods. This is broadly consistent with our interviews and press accounts of a notable increase in appropriations earmarks.
Analysis of the Electoral Cycle
The constitutionally defined electoral cycle is exogenous to the fiscal needs of states and other institutional variables that could affect appropriations. This allows us to use a simple tabular analysis to infer the effect of having an incumbent senator seeking reelection on a state's success in securing projects. 28 As Table 4 shows, states that have an incumbent of either party seeking reelection do better in the Senate appropriations process than states with senators that are "out of cycle." Furthermore, states that have an in-cycle senator not seeking reelection collect substantially fewer appropriations.
Compared to the baseline category of states without a senator in cycle, having an incumbent standing for reelection leads to a 15% increase in the average number of projects per year over a two-year congress (2.7 to 3.1 per year/per subcommittee) and a similar percentage increase in the average dollar amount of the projects ($5.5 to began passing complete substitutes for House bills. This meant that the entire bill, rather than just the portions in disagreement, was conferenced. This change made it much easier to rewrite the bill in conference, since the final bill would be considered in its entirety rather than in pieces. Even if the final bill violated the rules of the chamber, no member was willing to force a vote on a point of order for fear of bringing down the entire bill. One effect of this procedure was to make it easier to add earmarks during conference, because they were not considered "new" items. It also opened the door to the use of omnibus appropriations bills in which different spending bills are packaged in conference. Our interviews suggest that this offered more opportunities for altering bills in ways that might not have been possible if they had to stand alone after conference.
We only offer limited analysis of conference earmarks because the CAGW data do not allow us to test our theory of interchamber dynamics with these earmarks. The problem arises because conference earmarks are not attributed to specific members or even specific chambers by the CAGW. We explored the possibility of adding this information to the dataset and determined that it would be feasible in only a limited number of cases.
However, our interviews suggest that there are interesting interchamber dynamics in conference that could be modeled and examined empirically in future research. In particular, conference may provide one opportunity for partisan agenda manipulation. The instances of such manipulation that we have identified, however, do not involve appropriations themselves, but instead concern policy riders on appropriations bills. Thus, it is not clear that one would focus on earmarks if modeling partisanship in the appropriations process. $6.3 million). The loss when a state has a standing senator who retires is slightly larger on average, with a decline of 30% in the number and dollar amount of projects (2.7 to 1.9 and $5.5 to $3.8 million) secured by these states relative to states without a Senate election. For both comparisons we can be quite certain (p < .01, two-tailed) that the difference in the average number of appropriations did not arise by chance. The same is not true for the slightly noisier average total cost figures, which only reach conventional levels of statistical significance when comparing states with incumbents running to those with incumbents retiring.
The second column of the table suggests that the House exhibits the opposite bias. Compared to states without a Senate election, the House gives on average 11% (2.7 to 2.4) fewer pieces of pork to states with senators running for reelection and 18% (2.7 to 3.2) more to those with senators retiring. Similar but slightly smaller cyclical patterns are evident in the total average dollar amount of House appropriations. While none of these individual differences is statistically significant, the average number of projects that a state receives from each House subcommittee when it has a senator retiring (3.2) is significantly (p < .05) larger than the number it receives when it has a senator running (2.4). The difference of .8 projects per subcommittee counteracts two-thirds of the Senate bias of 1.2 projects in the opposite direction. We also find expenditure patterns consistent with our hypotheses. Indeed, nearly 50% of the spending advantage in the Senate going to states with a senator running is eliminated by the House. This does not mean that the House is sucessfully eliminating the disproportionate appropriations secured by in-cycle senators in their chamber, but instead that the House is allocating less to the states represented by in-cycle senators and more to other states.
In sum, what the Senate giveth, the House (partially) taketh away when one considers the aggregate outcome of the process. We find a positive bias in the Senate toward states with incumbents seeking reelection and a negative bias toward those with incumbents retiring that is consistent with our Electoral Cycle hypothesis, and a pattern of correction in the House consistent with our Countercyclical Response hypothesis. 29 An examination of the consequences of the Senate electoral cycle by Appropriations subcommittee jurisdiction conveys the depth and consistency of the interplay between the chambers. The cells in Table 5 display the difference in the change in average number of CAGW projects between states that had incumbent senators standing for reelection and states that had an incumbent retiring as a percentage of the number of projects going to states that had no Senate election. For example, the upper row indicates that in the Agriculture jurisdiction the Senate gave on average 17.6% fewer CAGW projects to states that had incumbent senators retiring than states that did not have an election and 29.2% more to states that had an incumbent running as compared to states with no 29 Crespin and Finocchiaro (2008) offer a careful analysis of CAGW project costs.
election. The total difference comparing these two extremes in the Agriculture subcommittee was 46.8% of the baseline number of CAGW-coded appropriations by the subcommittee. The final two columns in the first row indicate that the House counteracted much of this difference by allocating 36.5% fewer projects (relative to the baseline category) to states with running Senate incumbents than to states with retiring Senate incumbents.
For almost every subcommittee jurisdiction the Senate electoral cycle appears to influence the appropriations process in both chambers, with the Senate adding more projects for states that have a senator seeking reelection and the House partially counteracting this bias. One exception is the Labor and HHS jurisdiction, which funded fewer projects for states with senators running than for those that were out of cycle. However, in each chamber this subcommittee typically waits until conference to earmark, and thus the data for Labor and HHS in Table 5 are based primarily on a single congress in which the committee broke this pattern in the Senate. Another exception is the Commerce subcommittee, which allocates more projects to states that have retiring senators than to states with no election. Otherwise the patterns of thrust and counterthrust by the Senate and House across all of the jurisdictions are remarkably consistent.
In sum, the lottery-determined placement of states in the Senate electoral cycle, an ongoing natural experiment set in motion over two centuries ago, 30 allows us to 30 The main lottery, as noted, occurred in 1788 for the 11 states that had ratified the Constitution by that time. Remaining states were placed in the cycle profile as they were admitted to the Union so conclude with a reasonable degree of statistical certainty that there is a causal relationship between a state having a Senate incumbent standing for reelection and the number of CAGW projects the state receives from the Senate. The countercyclical allocations we observe in the House have two implications. First, they help dismiss concerns that the patterns in the Senate are due to a chance coincidence of Senate electoral cycles with the appropriation needs and desires of states. If these patterns were due to chance characteristics of the in-cycle states then we would expect them to be echoed in the House rather than to disappear or reverse. Second, they are consistent with our theoretical expectation that the House should anticipate or respond to the cyclical biases in the Senate by making up some but not all of the differences across states in light of shared credit-claiming opportunities.
Next we turn to structured statistical models to evaluate the robustness of our findings. One concern about the tabular analysis is that it does not account directly for the fact that we do not have fully independent observations in our dataset that includes multiple observations for each state and each subcommittee. Furthermore, the different levels of appropriations across subcommittees and over time could introduce noise into the data that could lead to misleading inferences. To respond to these concerns we estimated the statistical models presented in Table 6 .
The dependent variables in the first two models (columns 1-2 and 3-4) are integer counts of CAGW pork projects for each subcommittee-state-year. In the case of the Senate, this variable ranges from 0 to 74 additions from a single subcommittee to a state in a year. 31 The independent variables are the now-familiar electoral cycle categories (with the excluded category being states without a Senate election) and dummy variables for each subcommittee jurisdiction and each fiscal year. The standard errors are estimated with a robust sandwich estimator and clustered for subcommittee-state pairs.
The negative binomial estimates are transformed into incident rate ratios to allow easy interpretation. For example, the coefficient for having an incumbent senator running is 1.18, which indicates that from any given baseline level of appropriations, having a senator running will yield about 118% of the projects that would be allocated to a state having no election. The coefficient of .80 for as to smooth the number of senators in each of the three electoral classes. 31 Based on our estimates we can reject the null hypothesis that conditional variance of the number of CAGW projects for each venue is the same as the conditional mean, causing the standard Poisson count model to estimate artificially small standard errors. Thus, we estimate negative binomial regressions.
having a sitting senator retire indicates that a state will receive only 80% of the projects of a state having no Senate election. These effects are easily distinguishable from the null hypothesis (incident rate ratio -irr -of 1.00) and roughly on par with those we found in the tabular analysis.
The count model for the House provides further support for the findings of our tabular analysis. The estimates indicate that a state with a retiring senator will receive about 114% of the projects it would if it had no Senate election. In contrast, a state with a senator standing for reelection is estimated to receive only about 88% as many projects as it would have if it were out of cycle. Only the latter estimate reaches the conventional threshold of statistical significance, but a test of the hypothesis that the two coefficients are identical to each other (i.e., states that have incumbents running receive the same number of appropriations as states with incumbents retiring) can easily be rejected (p < .01).
One possible concern about focusing on the number of projects a state receives is that this could mask differences in the size of the projects. Our theoretical account suggests the possibility that the Senate would not only allocate more projects to states with senators standing for reelection (and less to those with senators retiring) but also that the projects might be larger (smaller) on average. On the other hand, one might be concerned that the differences we identify in the number of projects allocated to states at different points in the Senate electoral cycle are the result of how senators and representatives choose to spread their appropriation dollars across projects rather than differences in the amount of funds allocated to their states. The final two models in Table 6 (columns 5-6 and 7-8) present OLS regressions on the natural log of the average cost of the appropriations that a subcommittee makes to a state in a year. 32 The models for the House and Senate do not provide support for either of these hypotheses. Thus, while the number of appropriations projects that states secure in the House and Senate waxes and wanes with the electoral cycle, the size of each individual project does not seem to be influenced by these same forces.
We estimated two additional models (not reported in the table) in order to check the robustness of our findings further. The first model controlled for agenda-setter Note: The dependent variable for the first models is the number of projects added to appropriations bills in the specified chamber in a subcommittee-state-year. The dependent variable for the second models is the natural log of the cost of the average project added. The standard errors are clustered for subcommittee-state pairs. * p < .10, * * p < .05, * * * p < .01.
status in each chamber. The Baron-Ferejohn divide-thedollar approach that we adopted as the basis for our model of the bargaining process implies that players with agenda-setting power gain a disproportionate share of the dollar being divided. In the context of the appropriations process, agenda-setting power rests primarily in the hands of Appropriations Committee members. Among this select group, subcommittee members, and particularly the ranking members of party subcommittee delegations, have even greater agenda prerogatives (Fenno 1973) . Thus, accounting for membership in this select group of agenda setters might further reduce the random variation in our results and add precision to our estimates. However, in the parlance of experiments, it can be argued that this variable is "posttreatment" with respect to the exogenous electoral cycle. It is, for example, possible that senators are assigned to important agendasetter positions in the run-up to a close election just so they can gather more electorally valuable appropriations. 33 If this were the case, then controlling for this 33 At the beginning of the 107th Congress, Senator Tim Johnson (D-SD) was given a seat on the panel because he was believed to be vulnerable in the 2002 election cycle to John Thune, South Dakota's popular at-large member of Congress. Johnson ultimately defeated Thune by 524 votes after a campaign in which he touted his ability to deliver earmarks to South Dakota from his seat on the effect in a model would tend to understate the true importance of the cycle. We find that agenda setters receive substantially more appropriations in their chamber than others. Furthermore, the estimates of the cyclical effects remain but are attenuated to some degree in both chambers as the posttreatment analogy would suggest.
34
Another potential effect of agenda-setting power is reflected in the prospect that members of the majority party will exploit their numerical advantage, enabling them to take a disproportionate share of the discretionary pie. More directly relevant to our theory is whether the majority directs more resources to its incumbents who are standing for reelection and/or prevents the minority from pursuing this same strategy. The appropriations process is famously nonpartisan, but it is possible that partisan comity has broken down in the increasingly polarized atmosphere in Congress in recent years. Our interviews were informative on this point. The majority and minority staff on Appropriations subcommittees in the Senate to whom we talked all claimed that the majority party did not take an unreasonably large share of appropriations. At the same time, they emphasized how the mechanics of the process are structured through partisan channels: Democratic senators who desire a project make the request to the Democratic delegation on the subcommittee of jurisdiction and similarly for Republicans. The partisan committee delegations, in turn, make decisions about whether to fund these requests independently although the majority has the final say on each one. Thus, while we do not expect a bias toward the majority, the mechanics of the request process allow for the two parties to adopt different internal strategies for appropriating discretionary monies. 34 Interestingly, we find some evidence that each chamber counteracts the favorable bias in the other chamber for its agenda setters. Thus, states with Senate agenda setters suffer in the House process and vice versa. 35 It is also worth noting that opportunities for partisan agenda manipulation are limited when the standard procedures for considering appropriations bills are followed. Typically, appropriations bills are considered under an open rule in the House (Legislative Branch appropriations are the only exception) and, in accordance with Senate rules, are open to amendment in the Senate. They routinely receive substantial numbers of amendments in both chambers. For example, between FY1997 and FY2006, 80% of the Senate appropriations bills were voted on individually on the floor, and 92% of these bills were amended. Our interview data suggest that it is common for earmarks to be added as part of a "manager's amendment" offered by the chair and ranking member as part of an effort However, when we estimate models that distinguish different electoral cycle categories by party (dummies for majority senator running, majority senator retiring, minority senator running, minority senator retiring) as well as dummy variables indicating the partisan composition of the Senate delegation, we do not uncover any significant differences in the effects of the Senate electoral cycle on appropriations associated with majority status.
36
Perhaps this is because of the longstanding norm of bipartisanship in appropriations that many subcommittee staff mentioned during our interviews, but the bipartisanship also seems to serve a practical purpose. For example, a House staffer described how Tom DeLay directed the committee to zero out any earmarks for Rep. Stephanie Herseth (SD-AL) after she narrowly won a special election. Instead, Republican and Democratic staff on the committee conspired with Herseth to rename projects in the bill to remove any obvious district affiliation. Staff said they took actions like this because they recognized the need for minority support to pass bills. The story in the Senate, where rules favor the minority, was similar. As one Republican staffer said, "It takes UC [unanimous consent] to go to the bathroom around here." His implication was that cooperation with the minority was required to pass his bill. Similarly, one minority staffer speculated that it is because the minority would "bring the whole to build floor support for the bill. Members can attempt to remove an earmark by offering an amendment to strike it-but this is a rare and unsuccessful practice. It should also be noted that points of order can only be raised against an earmark if it is unauthorized (i.e., not earmarking funds from an authorized program). Points of order in the Senate can also be raised against nongermane amendments and amendments that are "legislative" in nature. Recently, the 110th Congress adopted new rules requiring public disclosure of earmarks and, in the Senate, permitting points of order against earmarks made in conference. These new rules were not in effect during the time period of our dataset. The only major exception to these typical procedures for floor consideration occurs when bills are wrapped into an omnibus appropriations conference report and never receive a stand-alone vote on the floor of one or both chambers. In these atypical circumstances there might be more opportunity for partisan maneuverings relative to bills passed by more standard procedures. 36 See Crespin and Finocchiaro (2008) for an analysis that suggests the majority party does enjoy a disproportionate share of the dollar value of CAGW appropriations. We find some support for this claim. However, one difficulty with assessing this claim is that the effect of being the majority party is identified in our model by the fact that the Republican party held the Senate majority from 1995 to 2000, lost it to the Democratic party in [2001] [2002] , and regained it in the 2002 election. One could reach firmer conclusions either way if there were more reversals of the partisanship of majority status. One potential explanation for a majority bias in the size but not in the number of appropriations is offered by Balla et al. (2002) . They argue that the majority allocates a substantial share of appropriations to the minority to protect itself from criticism, but reserves particularly valuable projects for members of the majority party.
goddamn thing down" if the majority did not allow them to offer help to their members at election time.
In sum, the findings of our tabular analysis are strengthened by statistical models that control for heterogeneity across subcommittee jurisdictions and across time and for other institutional factors.
Conclusion
Our analysis provides strong support for our theoretical claim that the Senate electoral cycle shapes the appropriations process. We leverage the exogenous electoral cycle to conclude that the Senate allocates substantially more CAGW projects and dollars to states in congresses when they have an incumbent senator standing for reelection compared to congresses when they do not have a senator standing for reelection. The Senate also allocates noticeably fewer projects (and dollars) to states that have a sitting incumbent who is retiring at the end of a congress. These combined effects mean that a state can expect appropriations for almost 45% fewer projects if its incumbent senator retires than if the senator were to run.
The Countercyclical Response hypothesis also receives support from our analysis which suggests that overall, and in nearly every jurisdiction considered separately, the House corrects for Senate cyclical bias appropriating fewer projects to states that have senators standing for reelection and more to those with senators retiring. In sum, we find that the House blunts the Senate bias, reducing it by nearly two-thirds.
One might suspect that these cyclical patterns simply result from senators being more active in seeking appropriations in election years and their counterparts in the House taking note of this. Our interviews suggest that the story is more complicated. Subcommittee staff relate that senators actively push for earmarked pork barrel projects all the time because the marginal cost of doing so is quite small with the existing staff apparatus and a routinized request process. It may seem more plausible that the depressed level of appropriations associated with retirement is due to senators less aggressively pursuing them. While this might be the case, our interviews suggested that their offices still formally processed and regularly pursued requests even after their retirement decisions. 37 37 Staff on each Appropriations subcommittee routinely survey members early in the process, encouraging them to submit project requests in a timely manner. In the House, the committee has instituted an automated process with a web form that representatives' offices complete online. In both chambers, members typically submit a substantially longer list of requests than can be funded.
Most appropriations subcommittee staff volunteered that they differentiate whose projects will get support on the basis of who is, to use the staffers' term of art, "in cycle," and we believe their choices and those of their principals are key to establishing the patterns we find. One Senate subcommittee staff director, for example, reported that the staffs of senators who are out of cycle will often complain about not receiving a marginal earmark, but will typically accept the explanation that their requests were denied in order to prioritize those "in cycle." He explained that there were some Senate offices that were well known for nevertheless elevating their complaints to the "member-to-member" (i.e., senator to ranking Senate subcommittee member) level. In his jurisdiction, the subcommittee staff tried to anticipate which Senate offices would take this route and "shorted" them even further in the initial markup so the ranking member would have something to offer when the inevitable complaint came. Overall, this process makes requesting appropriations earmarks easy, putting the onus on the subcommittees and their staffs of evaluating the relative policy and political merits of member requests. This conveniently allows senators, continuously throughout their terms, to claim credit publicly for going to bat for home-state constituents, while actually delivering at the right time-in the run-up to election.
Put together, our theoretical and empirical analyses suggest that the chamber-specific appropriations processes have marked biases that echo across the Capitol. The interplay between the electoral motive of legislators and the WHYDFML preferences of voters pulls Senate appropriations away from the smooth flow that members of the House would prefer. Yet our theoretical model suggests that the bicameral structure of the legislature blunts these chamber-specific tendencies, and our empirical analysis provides support for this.
From a modeling perspective, we introduce the concept of contested credit claiming to a model with simple, and admittedly heavy-handed, assumptions. We anticipate that it will prove important as we move toward examining more complex theoretical settings. The empirical payoffs from our preliminary efforts to elaborate this concept suggest that it potentially provides a broad and fruitful line of research.
Our study is of course restricted to the most malleable of appropriations-those for earmarks and other relatively minor discretionary programs. One reason to care about these small-beer spending measures is that This allows them to inform their constituents and other interested parties that they have made formal requests. However, the subcommittees require the offices to prioritize their serious requests. These prioritizations are closely guarded secrets. they have been exploding over the past decade, as seen in our data and in other indicators. One of these indicators that we encountered face-to-face is the number of former appropriations staff (a few of whom we interviewed) who now make a healthy living in a cottage industry that hardly existed 15 years ago-lobbying for earmarks. Although most of the money the government spends is not yet within the reach of those who seek earmarks, they are managing to claim a growing share of programmatic, discretionary spending. To hear the more veteran Appropriations staffers tell it, the part of the sky they hold up is now falling.
But there is a more general message here. Our findings provide an example of why the strategic interaction that characterizes bicameralism has important consequences that would not be evident if one focused only on aggregate outcomes or the actions of one chamber in isolation. By analyzing aggregate outcomes, one would miss the fact that the staggered terms of the Senate push toward different policies than the simultaneous terms of the House. Likewise, an exclusive focus on appropriations by the Senate would lead one to conclude incorrectly that Congress as a whole distributes appropriations earmarks in a cyclical and inefficient manner. This would overlook the fact that bicameralism compensates for much of the bias caused by the Senate electoral cycle. These findings are of more general interest. They should prove valuable in understanding congressional politics in substantive areas outside of appropriations politics. They should also help shed light on bicameral politics in other settings, e.g., American state legislatures. Finally, they demonstrate the promise of using a combination of theoretical and empirical approaches to study how different institutions, with different time horizons and bargaining tools, interact in the production of public policy.
